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Abstract. Motivated by the concerns of cooperation security, this work exam-
ines selected principles of state-of-the-art reputation systems for multi-hop 
ad hoc networks and their impact upon optimal strategies for rational nodes. An 
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tion-enforcement schemes. It is pointed out that optimum rather than high repu-
tation can be expected to be sought by rational nodes. 
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1 Introduction 
Wireless ad hoc networks are gaining popularity as a growing number of areas of 
human activity require omnipresent and self-configuring connectivity. One of the 
greatest advantages of this network concept – the lack of central infrastructure and 
governing authority – is its greatest challenge as well. Until its inception, standards 
ruling networks’ operation were obeyed ensuring their optimal performance. In the ad 
hoc paradigm, this fundamental law is disputed, as the autonomy of network nodes 
enables them to neglect collective welfare and selfishly optimize their individual utili-
ty [1]. Motivations behind these decisions may be of different origin, to boost node’s 
performance, lengthen operational life, etc. Some of these effects may be introduced 
intentionally by node’s software programmers, others may emerge out of non-hostile 
optimization techniques employed. The scarcity of resources, namely of battery pow-
er and bandwidth, aggravate the problem. 
Selfishness ensures a better performance of a node compared to nodes following 
the primarily altruistic network standards. The impact on the network is minimal until 
there are few selfish nodes. However, other nodes in the network may quickly learn to 
acquire the same strategy. As the number of selfish nodes grows, the network perfor-
mance drastically deteriorates and eventually the network disintegrates, calling into 
question its very mission. This is clearly a security (more precisely, cooperation secu-
rity) issue, since it directly impacts the inter-nodal communication capability. 
Such considerations are not unusual in the realm of game theory [2]. They are used 
to explain a well-known phenomenon in multi-hop networks, where players following 
their best interest choose strategies resulting in non-optimal solutions for everyone, 
including themselves. In such games, the only solution improving the game results 
seems to consist in shaping the game in such a way that the non-cooperative (selfish) 
strategies become non-optimal for the players, and in promoting cooperative ones. 
The idea of discouraging network nodes from becoming selfish underlies the idea 
of reputation systems. Such a system, fed with experience reports from nodes that 
have had interactions with other nodes, disseminates information that helps deciding 
whether a certain node can be trusted to deliver a service on a certain service level. 
Other nodes, having this information can make decisions whether or not to cooperate 
with such a node, without any prior experience with it. This leads to the economic 
concept of indirect reciprocity [3], where nodes are rewarded or punished for their 
prior cooperative or noncooperative behavior towards nodes different from the ones 
they are currently interacting with. Such a system, to be useful and to actually encour-
age nodes to cooperate, has to be carefully designed to reshape the payoff matrix of 
the arising game so that globally non-optimal behavior becomes non-optimal to indi-
vidual nodes as well. 
In this paper we examine some state-of-the art principles of reputation systems 
with a special interest on how they influence individual nodal strategies and how the-
se strategies influence network operations, in particular if they actually discourage 
undesirable behaviors. This paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we briefly 
present the state of the art in reputation systems and previous work; in Section 3 used 
metrics are discussed; Section 4 discusses reputation systems' typical design assump-
tions and their impact on nodal strategies; Section 5 examines possible nodal respons-
es to modifications of utility functions; finally, Section 6 summarizes our findings and 
concludes the paper. 
2 Related work 
In recent years, reputation systems have become a popular research avenue addressing 
the problem of selfish nodes and cooperation enforcement. The basic concept entails a 
method of monitoring nodes’ behavior, a behavior-rating algorithm, reputation calcu-
lation and an algorithm of leveraging the calculated reputation in network operations. 
The key part of a reputation system is the cooperation detection and evaluation. The 
watchdog mechanism [5-10] is widely used in numerous wireless network environ-
ments. Its principle of work is based on omnidirectional characteristics of antennas 
typically employed by wireless network nodes. Assuming this, a node’s neighbors 
that are situated within the radio range can overhear all its communication. This 
mechanism is, however, innately unable to address non-uniform radio range, trans-
mission impairments, and unpredictable collisions. Other solutions focusing on identi-
fying a single misbehaving network node are based on a subnetwork of cooperating 
nodes observing the environment in their proximity and sending reports to other 
nodes. Such approach is exemplified by the Two-ACK scheme [5], based on addi-
tional short range ACKs sent by the intermediate nodes on a given path, and on the 
flow conservation presumption [6]. According to it, cooperative intermediate nodes 
keep a count of transit traffic and share it with other nodes; thus they are able to iden-
tify nodes responsible for "leaking" packets. A different concept, deriving agent repu-
tation from composed service of multiple agents [7], is used in [8] for detection of 
selfish nodes in military wireless sensor networks of a hierarchical directed tree to-
pology. The detection and avoidance of malicious nodes is orchestrated by a sink 
node. The operation of this system is divided into rounds, in each of which the sink 
node changes the network topology. The sink node gathers statistics on network be-
havior. Based on the delivery ratio for packets sent by a given source node, as well as 
the network topology and its changes, the sink is able to deduce malicious and suspi-
cious nodes in the network. A similar concept [9], based on end-to-end ACKs is used 
to deduce behavior of intermediate nodes from multiple reports on different paths in a 
MANET network; certainty levels of the results can be computed. 
Based on the results obtained from various detection mechanisms, usually in the 
form of delivery or forwarding ratios, nodes' reputation is calculated. Many reputation 
systems serve just to discern cooperative or misbehaving nodes measuring their be-
havior against a predefined desirable pattern [4] and returning a binary value describ-
ing a node’s positive or negative rating. Sometimes this binary metric is extended to 
define intermediate states or to indicate nodes of uncertain reputation. Alternatively, a 
more fine-grained view of a node is created [9], typically with real-valued reputation 
levels between 0 and 1, where 0 represents a completely uncooperative node and 1 a 
fully cooperative one. Usually reputation reflects nodes' behavior in a certain period 
of time and may be constantly recalculated. In some systems, when a node is labeled 
as uncooperative, it is regarded as such forever, whereas other systems offer possibili-
ties to regain positive, cooperative rating, either by resetting it after a predefined peri-
od of time or offering a "redemption" opportunity. 
The use of the calculated reputation can be twofold. On the service requesting side 
it is often used as an extension to routing algorithms assisting in path selection. A 
well-known solution, called pathrater [4], attempts to select a path without misbehav-
ing nodes. If such a path is unknown to exist at the moment, a path rediscovery phase 
is triggered. However, some authors, e.g., [10], stress that routing around misbehav-
ing nodes in fact rewards them, as they incur lower costs of participating in the net-
work; accordingly, they propose to route part of the traffic via lower-reputation nodes. 
This gives a node a possibility to regain ("redeem") high reputation and diversifies 
traffic among multiple nodes, while discouraging whitewashing (i.e., changing identi-
ty to restore unblemished reputation). On the service provision side, specifically when 
the service consists in forwarding transit packets, punishment may be administered by 
only forwarding packets originated at a cooperative source node, or doing so with a 
probability depending on the source node's reputation level [10]. Some systems use 
only the service requesting side, which may actually promote misbehaving nodes, 
giving a selfish strategy so called evolutionary stability. Recently, this concept, well-
known in game theory and in biology [3], has been linked to reputation systems to 
provide a more in-depth explanation of indirect reciprocity. In [3], a vast number of 
possible behaviors (or strategies) coupled with reputation systems are critically exam-
ined in order to identify evolutionarily stable (strategy, reputation system) pairs that 
perform well against nonstandard alien behavior. Best performing pairs are found to 
adhere to similar principles: by giving help to a good agent, the donor also earns a 
good reputation, whereas refusal of help to a good agent brings a bad reputation; re-
fusing to help ill-reputed agents does not undermine a good reputation. The authors 
note that ensuring evolutionary stability against a group of alien agents entails regard-
ing helping a good agent as good, and helping a bad agent as bad. Thus indirect reci-
procity, i.e., cooperative behavior toward third parties, is promoted. 
In [11], a game-theoretic study of nodes’ behavior dynamics is presented and an at-
tempt is made to search an equilibrium. The authors propose a reputation system 
where nodes locally observe the behavior of paths they are using based on their deliv-
ery and deduce therefrom the behavior of every node. The authors associate the gain 
of a node with sends a successfully delivered source packet or receives a destination 
packet; the loss is associated with forwarding a transit packet on behalf of some other 
source node. The parameters under nodes' control are: the forwarding ratio of transit 
traffic on a given incoming link, the amount of outgoing traffic and a threshold value 
of packets dropped by other nodes on a given outgoing link. Based on those arbitrarily 
set values and a utility function, a node is able to adjust its behavior towards other 
nodes, which in extreme cases may even result in completely shutting a given net-
work link. The influence of the network size and traffic volume is demonstrated – the 
more source traffic a node has, the better forwarding service it provides. 
3 Network resources and utility functions 
We restrict the focus of a reputation system to packet forwarding along paths set up as 
sequences of nodes to traverse. However, our reasoning can be carried over to other 
types of network service. The service can be measured and quantified into a set of key 
performance indicators (KPIs), enabling evaluation and comparison of the imple-
mented solutions. In the history of computer networks, a significant number of KPIs 
have been developed. A network node requests a specific amount of service to be 
provided by the network that it may regard as an abstract external entity. Due to dif-
ferent network phenomena, limited communication capacity, protocol constraints or 
node’s policy, the node's requests can be serviced either in full or to some extent, or 
completely rejected. Each unit of service costs the requesting node and the servicing 
entity some defined cost, which we model as constant across all the nodes. Cost-based 
analysis of nodes' and network's operations is a well-established direction of research 
in computer networks. To discover and evaluate nodal motivations behind selfishness 
one needs to know what drives their behavior and how their costs (also referred to as 
utilities) are created. This knowledge allows one to build effective network solutions 
shaping nodal utility in a way that is desired from the network perspective. 
To examine  nodes' strategies in a simplified model we propose a concept of a 
game between a node X and the network N, pictured in Fig. 1. The two parties in this 
game are issuing towards each other service requests and are interested in achieving 
optimal performance. Hence, both employ techniques enabling them to evaluate an-
other party behavior and to respond to it adequately. The network N employs a reputa-
tion system and utilizes the concept of indirect reciprocity, and is modeled by node X 
as a single, albeit complex entity. On the technical level, indirect reciprocity is en-
sured by an agreed upon (centralized or distributed) algorithm of reputation calcula-
tion, dissemination the reputation values among network nodes, and a specific algo-
rithm of nodal response to the assigned reputation. There are many methods employed 
to resolve these issues, some of them were summarized in the related work section. 
Node X employs the concept of rationality and ability to define its own cost-effective 
strategies. In the presented game model, following variables and parameters are taken 
into consideration: 
 
Fig. 1. Model of a game between node X and the network N. 
 SXN  – amount of service (in service units) requested by node X from the network N. 
 SNX   – amount of service requested by the network N from node X; in our model, 
for the sake of meaningful evaluation of node X’s behavior, SNX > 0 is assumed. 
 TX  [0, 1] – policy of node X stating what proportion of SNX is to be provided, 
 UX  – utility node X draws out of being connected to the network, 
 b    – available bandwidth (in service units), 
 e    – observation error reflecting the inability of the network N to correctly assess 
the behavior of node X because of the flaws in the network operation and/or radio 
environment, 
 RX   [0, 1] – reputation of node X related to the value of TX evaluated by N in a 
way defined by chosen reputation system, i.e., RX is a function of  TX, SNX and e,  
 TN  [0, 1]  – policy of the network N towards node X, i.e., the proportion of X's 
requested service SXN that is provided; it is a function of RX, and 
 G – service value; a constant representing how valuable for node X is the service it 
requested from the network N, i.e., how much node X is determined to pay for SXN 
if it is serviced by the network N. 
The above variables and parameters result from the network design decisions, (in 
particular concerning the reputation system the indirect reciprocity mechanism), the 
radio environment, and the network’s and node X’s requirements for service. The 
policy TX is the only variable that can be set according to node X's strategy. Because 
TX is directly unobservable, the network can only rely on RX calculated by the reputa-
tion system based on the past observations of node X's behavior. Ideally, if the system 
uses a fine-grained reputation metric. If e = 0 and the observations sample is large 
enough, RX should reflect TX precisely for the network N. We will use the assumption 
RX = TX henceforth.  
To evaluate node X's utility we propose a utility function (1), representing node X's 
gain from being connected to the network. The goal of node X is to select a strategy 
that maximizes its utility function with respect to the chosen service, i.e., forwarding 
source traffic, while taking some environmental limitations into account (2). Hence, 
the optimization problem for node X can be stated as follows: 
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UX,  is a function of node X's behavior, with respect to the amount of service it pro-
vides to the network N, as assessed by the network’s reputation mechanism producing 
the value RX, and the amount of service the node X receives from the network N. Node 
X, being in control only of its service policy, in response to the obtained UX, assesses 
its optimal TX to maximize its utility, taking into account the network’s limited band-
width for service provision (2). The bandwidth is consumed by issuing own requests 
taking into account requests that need to be reissued (i.e., SXN /TN), and processing 
network’s requests (i.e., SNX(1+TX), where the (1+TX) term comes from the nature of 
wireless network operation: SNX, even if not processed by node X, consumes its band-
width, since received requests occupy the radio medium and nothing can be broadcast 
at that time). Note that this model assumes that the rejected service requests should be 
reissued by node X until they are successfully processed by the network. In reality 
some threshold on number of reissues should be implemented to avoid a negative UX . 
However, the aim of this work is to show the effects of node X's rational behavior, 
and introducing such thresholds could blur the overall picture. 
The above game in which node X optimizes its utility against the employed reputa-
tion system, and the network attempts to accomplish its mission of providing net-
work-wide connectivity and well-being continues in search of an equilibrium. The 
general problem (1) takes on various forms depending on the specific network ser-
vices and operations, in particular the choice of the workings of the reputation system 
and the algorithm setting TN in response to RX. Examples of these specific formula-
tions will be examined in Section 4. 
4 Reputation systems' design impact on utility function 
There exist various methods of monitoring nodes' behavior as detailed in Section 2; 
most of them are not free from flaws that prevent them from determining nodes’ be-
havior precisely. The complexity of wireless network operation as well as the diversi-
ty of possible factors influencing it make it impossible to eliminate those flaws com-
pletely. One way of dealing with this is to accept the measurements' imperfections 
and account for them when modeling the network's and reputation system's operation. 
This is the approach we follow here by including the e variable reflecting these flaws. 
Reputation, as an algorithm transforming observed node's behavior into numerical 
values of reputation, also has an impact upon the network's ability to distinguish and 
address various nodal behaviors. 
The most important part of the reputation system, from the operational cost view-
point, is the indirect reciprocity mechanism mentioned earlier, i.e., a set of algorithms 
constituting part of the network operation that reflect node X’s reputation. Indirect 
reciprocity may transform a reputation system from a pure signaling tool into an en-
forcement mechanism fostering nodes' cooperative behavior. In what follows we ex-
amine common design concepts and their influence on node X's utility function. 
4.1 Plain multi-hop ad hoc network 
A plain multi-hop ad hoc network does not account for nodes' rationality and assumes 
that all the nodes follow some predefined standard behavior. In such a network, there 
is no reputation system and the network provides service in response to node X's ser-
vice requests under a best effort policy regardless of its (not even monitored) behav-
ior. This is equivalent of RX  1, and the utility function (1) and node X's policy (2) 
are expressed as in (3) and (4), respectively: 
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X’s utility (3) is the difference between the gain from having own service requests 
successfully serviced ((G 1)∙SX) and the cost associated with servicing the network’s 
requests (TX∙SNX). We subtract 1 from G to reflect the cost associated with issuing the 
amount SXN of requests, which lowers node X's gain. 
4.2 Tit-for-tat reciprocity mechanism 
A tit-for-tat-type reciprocity mechanism enables the network N to respond in kind to 
node X's behavior, i.e., N provides requested service to X in the same proportion that 
X provides requested service to N: TN = TX. Formulas (1) and (2) transform into (5) 
and (6), respectively: 
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Formula (5) contains a term representing node X’s service requests rejected by the 
network that need to be reissued (SXN/TN), which was already discussed in (2). This 
replaces subtracting 1 from G in (3). 
4.3 Reputation metric 
Reputation metrics in general need not impact the mechanisms of monitoring node X's 
behavior. As stated earlier, some common reputation metric types are fine-grained 
and binary. The former takes node X's observed behavior to be numerically equal to 
its reputation, optionally with some additional scaling to reflect all possible behaviors. 
The latter incorporates an algorithm of transforming all possible behaviors into a dis-
crete, two-valued metric. Typically, this algorithm imposes a threshold tS upon the 
ratio of SXN and SNX, the crossing of which changes RX. The type of reputation  metric 
does not directly influence formulas (1) and (2), as it only influences the shape of the 
function  eSTR NXXX ,, . 
4.4 SNX reflecting node X’s reputation 
Besides enabling tit-for-tat service provision, reputation is often meant to assist net-
work nodes in selecting appropriate (trustworthy enough) nodes to interact with and 
request service from. The basic approach dictates that only highest-reputed nodes be 
considered. Other approaches are more refined and make use of lower-reputed nodes 
as well, allowing non-optimal performance. 
In the latter case, irrespective of the actual policy TN, it is often assumed that the 
network N is able to split its service requests to be alternatively serviced by nodes 
other than node X, hence node X gets only a part of the original amount of requested 
service SNX. To achieve this, the network N requires an algorithm to transform RX into 
a parameter determining the part of the original SNX directed to the node X. For sim-
plicity, we will assume this parameter is equal to RX (a general derivation of an opti-
mal transformation of RX into this parameter is beyond the scope of this paper). For-
mulas (1) and (2) change into (7) and (8), respectively: 
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Equations (7) and (8) introduce RX as a parameter influencing the amount of service 
requested by the network N from node X. The other terms are as in (3) and (4). 
5 Rational nodes’ strategies and their effects 
In this section we examine the concepts presented in Section 4, either by themselves 
or in selected combinations employed in the state-of-the-art reputation systems. We 
will focus on the impact of a given solution on node X’s utility and available strate-
gies. We will anticipate how the behavior of node X impacts the network operation 
and check if a given solution encourages nodes to become cooperative. One of our 
goals in this analysis will be how the utility UX and optimal TX for node X change 
depending on the ratio M of the requested amounts of service: 
 
XN
NX
S
S
M   (9) 
5.1 Plain multi-hop ad hoc network 
In a network without a reputation system, the utility function UX given by (1) has two 
components – one representing service requests originating from node X, and another 
one representing the cost of providing service in response to the network N’s requests. 
The policy TX, the only part of the model controllable by node X and acting upon SNX, 
is bounded only by the above cost and has no bearing upon SXN. The dominant strate-
gy of the node X in this situation is trivially TX = 0, irrespective of any parameters 
defining the game, meaning a completely uncooperative node. Therefore, if every 
network node were to be rational in terms of costs and gains, and follow this strategy, 
the network would disintegrate. 
5.2 SNX reflecting X’s reputation 
Solutions using this concept have only one possibility of influencing forwarding deci-
sions, which is by shaping the amount of service SNX the network N requests from 
node X in step with RX, and in this way shaping node X’s utility. The incentives indi-
cated in Section 5.1 become even stronger in equation (7), since SNX typically increas-
es as RX increases. However, RX is mainly influenced by TX, therefore by staying  
uncooperative and so keeping a low reputation, node X can lessen the amount SNX. 
Thus its optimal policy is TX = 0. Apart from a high utility, the optimal strategy also 
ensures a greater amount of available bandwidth, as transit traffic avoids the node X. 
A frequently used variant of this solution introduces a threshold tP on RX below which 
no service is requested from node X; at the same time, no reciprocity mechanism is 
used. The optimal TX changes and is now anywhere in [0,tP). However, from the net-
work N's perspective, it produces the same effect as in the variant without the thresh-
old implemented, since no service is provided by node X. 
5.3 Tit-for-tat reciprocity mechanism with fine-grained reputation metric 
In this subsection we analyze equations (5) and (6) extended with RX taken from (7) 
and (8) along with fine-grained reputation metric detailed in Sec. 4.3. The node X’s 
optimal policy becomes more complex when playing against a network using a tit-for-
tat fine-grained strategy, and becomes then more dependent on M. If M <1, the opti-
mal policy for X is TX = 1. However, as M grows, the optimal TX decreases though at 
much slower rate (Fig. 2.), i.e., is roughly proportional to the logarithm of M. The 
utility at TX = 0 is always infinite negative, i.e., no service is provided to X by the 
network N. In all cases charted on Fig. 2 constant G equals 10. However, as it can be 
observed on the dotted line chart, representing the case were M=50, value G is insuf-
ficient to elevate UX above 0. A rational node, in this case, should restrain from 
providing any service to the network, i.e. TX=0 as well as it should stop issuing its 
own request to the network. 
 
Fig. 2. Node X’s utility vs. TX; several UX plots are shown for various M  and G = 10. 
5.4 Tit-for-tat and binary reputation metric 
This subsection analyzes in detail equations (5) and (6) along with binary reputation 
metric described in sec. 4.3. Node X's strategy implements a threshold tS on TX which 
marks a border between RX = 0 and RX = 1. Below this threshold no amount of re-
quested service SXN is granted by the network, thus node X’s utility is infinite negative 
the node has no perception of being connected. On the other hand, nodes with TX ≥ tS 
get their SXN granted in full. Node X’s optimal strategy in this game variant is TX = tS, 
because it still can refuse to service some part of SNX and at the same time enjoy a full 
service of its requests and a full perception of being connected. 
From the network N's perspective, in the error-free environment (e = 0), the opti-
mal value of tS would be 1, as it would force X to be fully cooperative and there would 
be no discrepancy between the proportion of service provided by N and X. However, 
in reality the wireless network environment is not perfect, i.e. e > 0, and proceeding 
this way would exclude some cooperative nodes from the network. The specific num-
ber of excluded nodes depends on the actual value of e. Given its stochastic nature, 
optimal selection of tS is hard. 
5.5 Tit-for-tat and fine-grained strategy with a threshold 
The last strategy examined in this paper is a modification of the tit-for-tat strategy 
analyzed in Section 5.3, with a threshold tS on RX above which the network N starts to 
send its service requests to node X. The optimal TX in this case should be just below tS 
in a general case. However, if M ≤ 0.5 then the policy TX in [tS, 1] turns out to give a 
slightly better performance due to the lower cost of servicing SXN. 
This strategy poses the same problem of accurate definition of the threshold value 
as in the binary metric case. However, the discrepancy between the amount of service 
received and provided by the network N is eliminated, as is the problem of partially 
cooperative nodes. The most serious issue with this strategy is the optimal TX that 
makes node X useless to the network, and creates a strong incentive for all nodes to 
follow it to minimize their costs if the amount of service requested from them is sig-
nificant. 
6 Summary 
We have introduced a framework for analysis of cost incentives driving nodal behav-
ior under a reputation system, enabling comparison of different solutions and evalua-
tion of new concepts. We have sketched some of the most common strategies of repu-
tation systems for wireless ad hoc networks and enabled an analytical confirmation of 
some heuristic findings, such as the necessity of incentive-driven reputation systems 
in ad hoc networks, the need of indirect reciprocity towards rational nodes and the 
insufficiency of merely signaling uncooperative behaviors. We have showed the pos-
sibility of creating a reputation system able to shape nodes' utility functions in a way 
that will enforce a non-trivial service provision, by making it a strategy of highest 
utility for a rational node. Another contribution is made by pointing out the risk of 
excessive exploitation of high-reputation nodes in a way that lowers the amount of 
service provided to the rest of the network. Thus a need for creation of a fair load vs. 
reputation balancing mechanism in ad hoc networks has been shown. In the near fu-
ture, the qualitative findings of this paper will be verified through extensive simula-
tions of realistic wireless network environments and a more detailed analysis. 
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